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Abstract
Real Earnings Management involves the deviation from normal business practices to manipulate
financial statements. Previous research has shown how higher gender diversity in senior
management has led to higher earnings quality, and how firms with female CFOs have less
earnings management than male CFOs. This paper will build off previous research and further
examine whether CEO gender affects real earnings management and if so, its effects on real
earnings management. The main hypothesis of the paper is that the gender of the CEO will affect
the extent of real earnings management of a firm; firms with male CEOs will see a higher
earnings management, while firms with female CEOs will have lower earnings management. The
paper's methodology primarily entails taking a sample of US public firms to measure real
earnings management factors of abnormal cash flows, discretionary expenses, and production
costs against CEO gender. This involves performing a regression analysis in order to prove the
validity of the hypothesis. Results show that the main hypothesis of this paper is not supported
by the sample data. Instead, the results suggest that CEO gender does not affect the likelihood of
real earnings management. This contributes to the literature by shedding light on the effect of
CEO gender on the extent of real earnings management.
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1. Introduction
Investors trust the integrity of the financial markets. They invest and trade in stock,
because they trust that markets offer them a potential gain in capital. This integrity is upheld by
auditors, who ensure the accuracy and reliability of the firms’ financial statements, and by
management, who has an ethical and professional responsibility to report with a high level of
earnings quality. Earnings quality has been defined as “the degree to which reported earnings
capture a firm’s economic reality” (Krishnan and Parsons 2008). A perfect system would have
firms that always release statements containing high earnings quality, however in reality, that is
not the financial system that exists.
The earnings quality of a financial statement decreases when management participates in
what is known as earnings management. Conversely, the earnings quality increases when
management’s penchant for earnings management decreases. Earnings management can be
defined as actions taken by management to mislead investors about the true nature of financial
operations of a firm. Management primarily engages in earnings management to increase the
firm’s stock price and or increase management’s compensations, which is often tied to a
company’s bottom line or stock price (Lovata et. al 2016). As earnings management is the
manipulation of earnings, it is of specific interest then to understand what causes earnings
management in order to minimize it.
2. Literature Review and Hypotheses Development
A survey of the literature shows that earnings management manifests in two different
ways: accrual and real earnings management. Accrual earnings management is described as
management’s manipulation of earnings through the usage of accounting estimates and methods
(Sun, Lan, & Liu 2014). On the other hand, real earnings management is more focused on
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changing the firms’ underlying operations to improve the numbers on the financial statement.
The important difference between the two methods to manage earnings is that real earnings
management has a more direct impact on the firm value. Gunny (2015) describes accruals
management is cheaper for the firm, but managers still choose real earnings management for a
number of reasons: accruals invite more litigation, are under more auditor scrutiny, and is limited
by prior years’ business operations and results. It is documented that these two methods work as
substitutes of each other; as firms become constricted in their ability to use the accrual method,
they start to engage in more real earnings management (Chi, Lisic, and Pevzner, 2011). Because
of the focus accrual earnings management has received from prior research, the focus of this
paper will primarily be on real earnings management.
Focusing on effects, Gunny (2015) explains that the consequences of real earnings
management is more severe, as the operational decisions taken to manage earnings have a greater
possibility of negatively affecting subsequent years’ performance. It is costlier to the owners of
the firm (the stockholders) than to the managers, who are incentivized to manage earnings.
Focusing on incentives, researchers have found that greater audit quality, stricter SOX
imposed rules, and impending debt covenant violations have driven firms to engage in real
earnings management (Chi, Lisic, and Pevzner, 2011; Järvinen and Myllymäk, 2016). Liu and
Espahbodi (2014) depict that dividend-paying firms engage in real earnings management through
earnings smoothing, due to dividend-related incentives. In addition, research has found that
management utilize real activities when material weaknesses existed and have been discovered
by auditors (Jarvinen and Myllymaki 2016). Furthermore, even firm size has an effect on the
extent of earnings management; Kim, Liu, and Rhee (2003) finds that smaller and medium sized
firms engage in more earnings management, although larger firms are more aggressive in
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avoiding a decrease in earnings. This encompasses the research focusing on firm-related factors
that drive real earnings management.
Where there is a gap in the literature is in the area of personal factors and incentives
driving real earnings management. For example, Kuang, Qin, and Weilhouwer (2014) illustrate
how CEO origin (whether a CEO is hired internally or externally) affects accrual earnings
management but not the extent that it affects real earnings management. Others have focused on
the friendship of CFO/CEO and the board, and they have found that board independence can be
eroded due to these ties (Rose, Rose, Norman, and Mazza, 2014; Krishnan, Raman, Ke, and Wei,
2011). It showed that the existence of a friendship can lead to higher earnings management. This
research can be further expanded to detect whether this holds true for accrual or real earnings
management specifically. There is also much research done regarding the characteristics of the
board of directors and its relationship with extent of real earnings management. The
independence of the board of directors has been found to be key in mitigating real earnings
management (Talbi et. al 2015). Within the board of directors is the audit committee, which is
tasked with oversight of the financial statements and processes. As they monitor the movements
of management, there is an expectation that the audit committee can minimize the extent of real
earnings management. Visvanathan (2008) illustrates that a larger audit committee is more likely
to monitor management, however Sun et. al (2014) has found that the busyness of audit
committee is another factor to consider. The more directorships an audit committee member has,
the harder it is for them to effectively monitor management. As a result, it could be more
difficult to restrain real earnings management.
Rather than looking at firm-specific factors and oversight bodies, this paper will focus on
senior management. Cheng, Lee, and Shevlin (2016) examined the factor of internal governance
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and its relationship with real earnings management. They find that when key subordinates, e.g.
the CFO, COO, President, are able to play a more important role within the company and are in
firms where the CEO is less powerful, internal governance is more effective in restricting the
extent of real earnings management. In addition, when CEOs have greater career concerns and
have more incentives to maintain firm performance, internal governance is also more powerful in
restraining the management of earnings. This adds on to prior research that illustrates that older
CEOs, who are nearing the end of their career, are more likely to utilize real earnings
management, in comparison to their younger counterparts. CEOs are important to the study of
real earnings management as they are usually required in deciding whether or not to use real
activities to inflate earnings, and they are usually held accountable when a company’s
performance declines (Lovata et. al 2016). Due to the key role CEOs play within managing
earnings, it will be the focus of this paper. Specifically, this study seeks to answer the question of
whether or not the gender of the CEO has any effect on the extent of real earnings management,
and what kind of effect arises from it.
The CEO characteristic of gender was chosen due to a gap in the literature. As more
women enter the C-suite and the highest glass ceiling is shattered, there is a burgeoning interest
in how their leadership will affect the business world. Prior research has shown that there is a
mixed consensus on the impact of gender on ethical judgement, which is a factor that affects a
person’s willingness to manage their firm’s earnings. Ye, Zhang, and Rezaee (2010) do note that
women are generally more ethical than men. In addition, Krishnan and Parson (2008) illustrate
that the addition of women creates a diversity in senior management that improves earnings
quality. Peni and Vahamaa (2010) note that there is evidence that female CFOs are more
conservative than their male counterparts. This is further supported by research that shows firms
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with female CEOs are more like to make less risky financing and investment choices (Faccio,
Marchica, Mura 2016). Despite less risky choices, female CEOs have also been found to
statistically outperform male CEOs on average (Peni 2012). Furthermore, it is interesting how
the market seems to judge female CEOs versus their male counterparts. The market seems to
hold the stereotype that women are more risk averse than males, as changes in capital market risk
measures following a woman’s appointment as CEO is lower than if a male CEO had been
appointed (Martin, Nishikawa, Williams 2009). Based on prior literature on the factor of gender,
capital allocation, and risk aversion, women in management would seem less likely to utilize real
earnings management than their counterparts. Other researchers have focused on a mixture of
CFO or CEO and gender in their studies but have taken to looking at firms in other countries. For
example, Ye, Zhang, and Rezaee (2010) had looked at the gender of top executives in Chinese
firms. They had found no significant differences between male and female CEOs performance.
In contrast, Duong and Evans (2016) looked at the effect of CFO gender on earnings
management in Australian firms. Their results evince that female CFOs engage less in real
earnings management.
In summary, while researchers have begun to look at the effect of gender in senior
management on earnings management, there is hardly a definitive one. Instead of looking at the
CFO position, this study has chosen to specifically look at the CEO position, which is the
position that guides most of a firm’s decisions.
Based on the gap in literature and building on prior research on gender studies and
earnings management, this study will posit three different hypotheses.
3. Gender and Real Earnings Management Factors: Hypotheses
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This study relies on prior literature to develop our proxies for real earnings management.
Cohen, Dey, and Lys (2008) build on prior studies by looking at abnormal levels of cash flow
from a firm’s operations, discretionary expenses and productions costs, when measuring the
extent of real earnings management. First, management can increase the amount of sales by
changing company policies. For example, they may provide discounts on price or by lowering
their credit. An increase in sales, directly contributes to an increase in net income. This increase
in net income is contained within the period where discounts exist, and it decreases the amount
of cash flow the company has. As female CEOs are described as more conservative in their
strategic decisions, they seem less likely to employ sudden price discounts or creating more
lenient credit terms to boost sales. Therefore:
H1. Ceteris paribus, firms with female CEOs will exhibit lower sales manipulation.
Second, management can also increase their bottom line, by decreasing one of their
biggest expenses: cost of goods sold. This is done through overproduction of inventory; the more
units that are produced, management is able to spread fixed costs across a larger amount of units.
This can become problematic, as larger amounts of inventory produced may far exceed the
demand for it. The company may incur large holding costs and they may experience inventory
obsolescence. Hence, higher production costs are a measure of real earnings management. Based
on the literature, female CEOs are less likely to make risky decisions, so female CEOs may be
less inclined to overproduce inventory to increase the bottom line. Therefore:
H2. Ceteris paribus, firms with female CEOs will exhibit lower production costs.
Finally, management may increase earnings through the deferral of discretionary
expenses. Discretionary expenses include SG&A expenses, R&D expenses, as well as
advertising expenses. The reduction of these expenses will typically increase net earnings,
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however, these expenses are usually undertaken as they add value to the firm. One period’s
earnings may be higher, but as a result, subsequent periods may show a firm suffering due to a
decreasing in these value-adding activities. As previous literature has discussed, female CEOs
are found to statistically outperform male CEOs, despite their less risky choices. Therefore, it
seems likely that female CEOs may not employ deferring discretionary expenses to boost
earnings. Thus:
H3. Ceteris paribus, firms with female CEOs will exhibit normal levels of discretionary
expenses.
4. Research Design
The initial sample used for this research consists of all firms with available financial data
from COMPUSTAT. Firms that are part of the financial services industry have been excluded,
due to different financial incentives for firms in that industry. In addition, the initial sample
includes the firms’ annual data from 1999 to 2017. After exclusions have been made due to
missing data, the final sample to measure abnormal cash flow, production costs, and
discretionary expenses are 23,839, 20,874, and 14,524 firm-year observations, respectively.
Relying on Cohen, Dey, and Lys (2008), I first produced the normal levels of operations
from cash flow, production costs, and discretionary expenses. Cash flows from operations (CFO)
is expressed as a linear function of sales and change in sales. Next, normal levels of production
costs are the sum of cost of goods sold (COGS) and change in inventory during the year.
Furthermore, COGS is modeled as a linear function of current year sales, while change in
inventory is modeled as the linear function of change in sales and lagged changed in sales.
Finally, normal levels of discretionary expenses are expressed as a sum of advertising expenses,
SG&A expenses, and R&D expenses. It is modeled as the linear function of lagged sales.
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H1 is tested through the model:
CFO = α + β1Gender + β2Age + β3Compensation + β4Size
H2 is tested through the model:
Prod = α + β1Gender + β2Age + β3Compensation + β4Size
H3 is tested through the model:
Disc = α + β1Gender + β2Age + β3Compensation + β4Size
where:
CFO = Abnormal cash flows from operations
Prod = Production costs
Disc = Discretionary expenses
Age = CEO age
Compensation = total compensation package received by the CEO
Size = firm size, measured as the natural log of assets
Gender = 1 if female; 0 if otherwise
CEO control variables were included to mitigate the concerns of potential endogeneity.
While a firm related variable was included to capture the impact of a firm characteristic on the
extent of real earnings management.
5. Results
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics on the regressed variables, while Tables 2-4 present
results of my regression analysis. In my sample, there is an overwhelmingly large number of
male CEOs, in comparison to female CEOs. Notably, only an estimated 7% of the sample are
female CEOs, which may skew the results.
Table 2 shows the results of the regression analysis on abnormal cash flows against CEO
age, gender, compensation, and firm size. Only firm size is shown to have a negative relationship
with the dependent variable. Meanwhile, both CEO age, gender, and compensation is shown to
have a positive relationship with abnormal cash flows. Older CEOs, higher paid CEOs, as well as
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female CEOs are more likely to use sales manipulation techniques, like price discounts or lenient
credit terms, to manage earnings. As CEO gender is positively associated with abnormal cash
flows, H1 is not supported.
Table 3 presents the results of regressions of abnormal production costs against the CEO
age, gender, compensation, and the firm’s size. The results show that there only is a significantly
negative relationship between abnormal production costs and the firm size. This may simply
show that larger firms are less likely to increase production costs to manage earnings. However,
H2 is not supported, given that the results show a positive relationship between the CEO’s
gender and abnormal production.
Finally, Table 4 shows the regression analysis results of abnormal discretionary expenses
against the independent variables. Results reveal that within our sample, CEO age and
compensation show a negative but statistically insignificant relationship with abnormal
discretionary expenses. Meanwhile, both CEO gender and firm size are shown to have a positive
relationship with abnormal discretionary expenses. In regard to firm size, this might show that
larger firms are more likely to decrease discretionary expenses to manage earnings. This could
be that larger firms may do have more discretionary expenses, thus the decrease of such may
have a larger impact. As for CEO gender, the results are not statistically significant and do not
support H3, implying that female CEOs are not different from their counterparts in the tendency
of managing earnings through decreasing discretionary expenses.
6. Conclusion
The results of this study suggest that CEO gender does not affect the extent of real
earnings management in firms. Specifically, female CEOs are not different from male CEOs
when it comes to engaging in real earnings management activities. This shows a different result
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from prior studies. However, the research performed for this paper does have several limitations.
First, the sample size only contains 7% female CEOs, which means that while the sample size is
large, it is overwhelmingly skewed due to the uneven amount of male and female CEOs. Second,
the R2 for each model was relatively low, indicating that there are additional variables that can
explain these results. Third, the amount of control variables used in tandem with CEO is
relatively small in comparison to prior studies done. The results might not show as complete of a
picture. Nevertheless, the research done expands upon both literature of real earnings
management as well as gender studies. As more women take more roles in senior management,
especially in CEO roles, it is of interest to do this study again and further broaden research in the
area.
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Table 1
Variables

Mean

Median

Standard
Deviation

Minimum

Maximum

Gender

0.07408938

0

0.261925302

0

1

Production Costs

1817.67812

6.8705

12894.00296

-68147

362727

Lagged Sales

2626.03169

4.8175

16791.53012

-1269.295

483521

Change in Sales

100.227619

0

2187.299159

-101586.5

60931.538

Lagged Change in
Sales

100.402915

0

2089.497549

-101586.5

65072.866

CFO

329.596598

-0.107

2072.028524

-42287

58540

Discretionary
Expenses

1628.00259

129.37

5524.432827

0

104284

Age

57.6336156

57

7.644163596

33

97

Compensation

3436.88388

1698.131

6761.636803

0

255,355.676

Firm Size

2.49357189

2.79958072 1.801085362

-3

6.5244648
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Table 2: CFO
Coefficients

Standard Error t Stat

P-value

Gender

20.061701

59.16415973

0.33908537

0.73455122

Age

2.28883837

2.105383092

1.08713629

0.27699793

Compensation

0.00417608

0.002411148

1.73199008

0.08330046

Firm Size

-16.384543

8.802308786

-1.8613915

0.0627128

•
•
•

Multiple R: .02491989
R Squared: .000621
Adjusted R Squared: .00029523

Table 3: Production Expenses
Coefficients

Standard Error

t Stat

P-value

Gender

66.9912793

112.6802156

0.59452566

0.55217155

Age

-1.0070788

4.009775882

-0.2511559

0.8016978

Compensation

-0.0058001

0.004592116

-1.2630651

0.20658978

Firm Size

-40.155598

16.76430556

-2.3953034

0.01662151

•
•
•

Multiple R: .02512462
R Squared: .00063125
Adjusted R Squared: .0003548
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Table 4: Discretionary Expenses
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat

P-value

Gender

97.6333983 100.811345

0.9684763

0.33282564

Age

-4.0376679

3.587416812

-1.1255084

0.26039565

Compensation

-0.0013204

0.004108417

-0.321396

0.74791581

Firm Size

65.1628398 14.99848205

•
•
•

Multiple R: .04182998
R Squared: .00174975
Adjusted R Squared: .00142435

4.34462898 1.4063E-05

